

**Third Party Monitoring Team
Seventh Public Report, November 2020 to January 2022**

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Third Party Monitoring Team**Seventh Public Report, November 2020 to January 2022****1. Summary**

In line with the Terms of Reference of the Third Party Monitoring Team (TPMT), this seventh public report is intended to provide an overall assessment of developments in the implementation of the peace agreements concluded between the Government of the Philippines (GPH) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The agreements comprise the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) and the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) including its Annexes. This report covers the period from November 2020 to January 2022, continuing from the sixth public report on the period March 2019 to October 2020.

The constitution of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) as an autonomous political entity in early 2019 provided opportunities for meaningful self-governance in the Bangsamoro (see TPMT 6th Public Report). Implementation of the peace process saw steady progress but was slowed down by two factors: the continued impact of the COVID-19 pandemic which delayed consultative processes and program delivery, and debate over the extension of the transition phase in the Philippine Congress which absorbed much of the attention of the Parties during the reporting period.

Republic Act (RA) No. 11593 resetting the first regular elections in the BARMM from 2022 to 2025 and amending Section 13, Article XVI of RA No. 11054, the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL), was signed into law by President Duterte on 28 October 2021, thus ending an extended period of legal uncertainty. RA 11593 leaves Section 2, Article XVI of the BOL in place which states that the MILF shall lead the Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA).

Earlier, on 17 November 2020, the BTA Parliament had issued Resolution No. 93 urging Congress to extend the transition period, citing the sheer weight of its mandate coupled with shortfalls in resources, continued security threats and the effects of a lingering pandemic.

The reporting period witnessed several key achievements. In as far as the political track is concerned, a substantial part of the legislative task has been completed. Three priority codes have now been adopted, including two during the reporting period, the Bangsamoro Civil Service Code on 24 February 2021 and the Bangsamoro Education Code on 18 May 2021.

Intergovernmental relations (IGR) are managed formally through systematic interaction between the National Government in Manila and the BARMM Government in Cotabato, with the Intergovernmental Relations Body (IGRB) meeting on a regular basis for two years since its first consultative meeting in December 2019. However, two sub-mechanisms, the Philippine Congress - Bangsamoro Parliament Forum (PCBPF) and the Bangsamoro Sustainable Development Board (BSDB) have not yet been activated.

Among the milestones in IGR for this period is the transfer of Cotabato City into BARMM administrative structures which took effect on 15 December 2020 and the transfer of management of existing nature reserves and protected areas by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to the Ministry of Environment, Natural Resources, and Energy (MENRE) on 17 December 2020. The Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) also formally turned over the Cotabato City District Engineering Office (CCDEO) to the Ministry of Public Works (MPW) on 20 September 2021. The National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) and the Ministry of Indigenous Peoples Affairs (MIPA) also entered into a Memorandum of Cooperation on 5 November 2021 for the protection and promotion of the rights and well-being of indigenous peoples (IPs) in the BARMM.

On the normalization track, the third phase of the decommissioning process commenced on 8 November 2021. During this phase, a total of 14,000 combatants and 2,450 weapons of the MILF will be decommissioned. However, questions related to the provision of socio-economic packages for decommissioned combatants still need to be resolved. There is no agreement yet on defining guidelines for entry of MILF and Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) members into the Philippine National Police (PNP). Key recommendations put forward by the Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) have not yet been addressed.

Other achievements in the normalization process are the completion of training of 20 Joint Peace and Security Teams (JPSTs) out of which 14 teams have been deployed, the continued roll-out of actions on disbanding private armed groups (PAGs) in the BARMM as well as neighbouring provinces, and implementation of a program for the reduction and management of small arms and light weapons (SALWs).

We note progress on Confidence-building Measures (CBMs). President Duterte signed Proclamation No. 1090 on granting amnesty to members of the MILF on 5 February 2021 together with Executive Order (EO) No. 125 creating the National Amnesty Commission (NAC). The House of Representatives endorsed the provisions in May 2021, while the Senate adopted the House resolution in January 2022. The Camps Transformation Plan (CTP) and its Camps Transformation Investment Program (CTIP) was approved by the GPH and the MILF Peace Implementing Panels on 9 November 2021. To ensure resource mobilization for normalization, the Bangsamoro Normalization Trust Fund (BNTF) was launched on 19 May 2021.

A Marawi Compensation Bill was passed by the House of Representatives on 6 September 2021 and by the Senate on 31 January 2022.

With the extension now in place, the Parties have the opportunity to focus on completing the peace process with less time pressure. However, with several dimensions of the peace process still at an initial implementation stage there is no room for complacency. It is essential for the Parties to embrace the added time as an opportunity to revitalize the peace process and to address the remaining tasks with renewed vigour.

Looking forward, and before the extension takes effect, the TPMT encourages the following steps to consolidate the implementation of the peace process:

- Adopt priority legislations within the originally defined timeframe prior to June 2022;
- proceed with defining an IP law, which should be informed by results of wide public consultations, involving the main stakeholders;
- use the IGRB to methodically address pending issues and proceed with the operationalization of remaining IGR mechanisms;
- address perspective viewpoints in advancing on the normalization track as soon as possible so that these would not be passed to the next Administration;
- ensure swift and efficient implementation of the Amnesty provisions through the National Amnesty Commission;
- strive for greater security and prevention of violent incidents, whether involving rido, resource conflicts or extremism, through holistic and strategic measures.

With the extension of the transition period now in place and beyond the assessment of the reporting period, the TPMT believes that this is an appropriate time to look at the fundamentals of the peace agreements from a broader perspective, to assess what has been achieved and to record what remains to be done, also in view of a new Administration taking over by mid-2022. This report therefore provides a more comprehensive analysis of the current state of implementation of the peace agreements in the concluding Comments section.

2. Developments in the implementation of the agreements between the Parties

i. Activities of the Panels

This past year, the Government of the Philippines (GPH) and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) Peace Implementing Panels, chaired by Usec. David B. Diciano for the GPH and Mohagher Iqbal for the MILF, continued to meet regularly in the Philippines, virtually and physically in Manila and Cotabato City. Some of the key panel meetings include the following:

- on 14 December 2020 in Cotabato City, to discuss the details of socioeconomic packages for decommissioned combatants and the submission of the MILF list of combatants and weapons to the Independent Decommissioning Body (IDB) for the third phase of the decommissioning process;
- on 11 April 2021 virtually, the Panels renewed the mandate of the International Monitoring Team (IMT) until its TOR was revised on 30 June 2020;
- on 17 July 2021 in Makati City, to discuss the schedule of the third phase of the decommissioning process, among other pertinent issues;
- on 11 October 2021 in Cotabato City, the Panels agreed to form a study group to formulate a revised roadmap on the implementation of the CAB; and
- on 9 November 2021, the Panels approved the Camps Transformation Plan (CTP) and Camps Transformation Investment Program (CTIP).

Notable key events in the peace process during this period were:

- the turnover of Cotabato City to the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) on 15 December 2020;
- the issuance of Presidential Proclamation (PP) No. 1090 granting amnesty to members of the MILF and Executive Order (EO) No. 125 creating the National Amnesty Commission (NAC) on 5 February 2021;
- launch of the Bangsamoro Normalization Trust Fund (BNTF) on 19 May 2021;
- enactment of Republic Act (RA) No. 11593 on 28 October 2021 resetting the first regular elections for the Bangsamoro Government to 2025;
- launch of the third round of decommissioning on 8 November 2021 at the Old Provincial Capitol in Barangay Crossing Simuay, Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao; and
- passage of the Marawi Compensation Bill.

ii. Political Track***Extension of the transition period***

President Duterte signed RA 11593, which amended Section 13, Article XVI of RA 11054, the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL), on Thursday, 28 October 2021. RA 11593, a consolidation of Senate Bill 2214 and House Bill 10121, postpones the first regular parliamentary election for the Bangsamoro Government and synchronizes it with the 2025 national and local elections. The new law states that during the extension of the transition period the 80-member BTA shall continue as the interim government of the Bangsamoro region. The President may appoint 80 new interim members of the BTA who shall serve up to 30 June 2025 or until their successors shall have been elected and qualified.

The bill for the postponement of the first regular election for the Bangsamoro Government was approved by the House of Representatives on 21 September 2021 and by the Senate on 27 September 2021.

RA 11593 leaves Section 2, Article XVI of RA 11054 in place which states that the MILF shall lead the BTA.

The extension of the transition period confirms the status of the BARMM as the only region in the Philippines with a devolved parliamentary structure within a unitary presidential constitutional republic.

On 17 November 2020 the BTA parliament had issued its Resolution No. 93, urging the Philippine Congress to extend the transition period to afford it sufficient time to continue in performing its mandate, citing amongst other factors the effects of a lingering pandemic. Presidential Peace Adviser Galvez expressed his support for extending the Bangsamoro Government's term until 2025 on a number of occasions.

The civil society group Mindanao People's Caucus, which had recommended the extension in its "Rapid Midterm Review on the Bangsamoro Transition Period" in September 2020, called on the Bangsamoro Government to use the extension period to deliver promises to the Bangsamoro people.

Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA) Legislation

The BOL mandates the BTA Parliament to enact seven priority legislations:

NO.	PRIORITY LEGISLATION	STATUS
1	Bangsamoro Administrative Code	Passed on 28 October 2020

NO.	PRIORITY LEGISLATION	STATUS
2	Bangsamoro Revenue Code	Pending
3	Bangsamoro Electoral Code	Pending
4	Bangsamoro Local Government Code	Pending
5	Bangsamoro Education Code	Passed on 18 May 2021
6	Bangsamoro Civil Service Code	Passed on 24 February 2021
7	Bangsamoro Law for Indigenous Peoples (IPs)	Pending

The legislative agenda of the BTA is behind schedule due to restrictions in organizing sessions and consultations without violating COVID-19 protocols, especially given limited internet access in island provinces of the BARMM.

The remaining priority legislations are still subject to consultations prior to parliamentary deliberation. Preparations are underway for each of the remaining Codes. The issue of creating parliamentary districts is being addressed based on data of the 2020 Census on Population and Housing, including for the 63 barangays which joined the BARMM from North Cotabato following the 2019 autonomy plebiscite. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has been consulted on the draft Electoral Code which is expected to be adopted within the first half of 2022. The Local Government Code has been approved by the Bangsamoro Cabinet and has been filed in Parliament. The Revenue Code is very technical in nature and involves consultations with National Government agencies to ensure it is in line with applicable protocols.

The BTA is yet to pass the IP Code. While draft proposals have been prepared, its final version has not yet been cleared by the Bangsamoro Cabinet and it will still need to undergo public consultations. Representatives of non-Moro IP assert that the Code should specifically respond to their concerns, particularly ancestral domain, displacement, and human rights violations.

To reaffirm confidence in the work of the BTA it is important that outstanding priority codes will be adopted within the originally defined timeframe prior to June 2022.

Intergovernmental relations (IGR)

The principle of Intergovernmental Relations (IGR) was included by the GPH and the MILF Peace Negotiating Panels in the Annex on Power Sharing to the FAB to govern the asymmetric relationship between the Central Government and the Bangsamoro Government. This is

reflective of the recognition of the Bangsamoro identity and their aspirations for self-governance, making it distinct from other local governments.

The IGRB TOR agreed on 16 December 2019 stipulate that the mechanism should exhaust all means to resolve issues brought before it, including sharing of competencies and the implementation of national programs in the BARMM. To note that the IGRB is mandated to govern the relationship between the two governments, and shall resolve issues brought before it, including those "not covered by the other intergovernmental relations mechanisms." Unresolved issues shall be elevated to the President.

The IGRB, co-chaired by National Government Finance Secretary Carlos G. Dominguez and Bangsamoro Education Minister Mohagher M. Iqbal, has regularly convened for ten times since its inception. A year after its first meeting, the IGRB submitted to the President its first progress report, on 21 January 2021 at the Malacañan Palace in Manila. It is positive to note that the meetings of the IGRB have become a consistent element in defining the working arrangements between the Central Government and the Bangsamoro Government, thereby assuring regular interaction between the two governments.

As for other IGR mechanisms, 5 out of 7 bodies are operational, notably the (1) Intergovernmental Fiscal Policy Board (IFPB), (2) the Joint Body for the Zones of Joint Cooperation (JBZJC) with its TOR approved on 31 July 2021, (3) the Intergovernmental Infrastructure Development Board (IIDB) which began convening since 26 November 2020 and its TOR approved on 7 January 2021, (4) the Intergovernmental Energy Board (IEB), and (5) the Council of Leaders which held its first meeting on 18 January 2021, even though some Local Government Unit (LGU) members were not able to participate. The Philippine Congress – Bangsamoro Parliament Forum (PCBPF) still has to convene for its first meeting while the Bangsamoro Sustainable Development Board (BSDB) remains to be created by Parliament legislation.

To note that a number of informal meetings referred to as "Political Leaders Meetings" (similar to Council of Leaders meetings) took place in the context of discussions on the proposed extension of the BARMM transition period. While these Political Leaders Meetings were instrumental in bringing BARMM, LGUs and relevant Secretaries from Manila into dialogue to work towards a consensus on the extension, more regular Council of Leaders meetings are essential to mediate relations between the BARMM and local authorities with a view to harmonizing the use of resources.

A Technical Working Group (TWG) at the IGRB looked into the issue of whether powers and functions related to IPs in the BARMM rest with the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) or the Ministry of Indigenous Peoples Affairs (MIPA) in the BARMM.

Transfer of powers

Through the IGRB, counterpart National Government agencies and Bangsamoro Government ministries have been coordinating for the transfer of powers to the BARMM as stipulated in the BOL. This includes the transfer of properties and assets of offices of National Government agencies within the BARMM to the Bangsamoro Government and the inclusion of the BARMM in national programs funded and/or implemented by National Government agencies.

On 15 December 2020 at the Bangsamoro Government Center in Cotabato City, the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) ceremonially turned over the supervision of Cotabato City and the 63 barangays in North Cotabato to the Ministry of the Interior and Local Government (MILG). Other milestones for this period include the transfer of management of existing nature reserves and protected areas by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and the Ministry of Environment, Natural Resources, and Energy (MENRE) on 17 December 2020, turnover of the Cotabato City District Engineering Office (CCDEO) by the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) on 20 September 2021, and signing of the Memorandum of Cooperation between the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) and the Ministry of Indigenous Peoples Affairs (MIPA) on 5 November 2021 for the protection and promotion of the rights and well-being of indigenous peoples (IPs) in the BARMM.

A number of National Government agencies have not yet started the transfer of properties and assets of their offices within the BARMM. Also, the inter-agency committee to conduct the inventory of liabilities of the ARMM to be assumed by the National Government has not yet completed its mandate.

Fiscal autonomy

The FAB, considering that the Bangsamoro is among the most underdeveloped regions in the Philippines due to decades-long conflict, outlines measures to increase the Bangsamoro's revenue generation and wealth creation capacity, with the aim to attain the highest form of fiscal autonomy. These measures include taxing powers as well as other sources of revenue, including fund transfers from the Central Government (Block Grant and Special Development Fund for rehabilitation purposes), receipt of grants and donations, contracting loans and exploitation of natural resources. The BOL defines in detail how these sources of revenue are to be created respectively calculated.

On 24 December 2020 the BARMM approved a PhP75.6 billion budget for 2021 and on 28 December 2021 the BTA passed the proposed PhP79.862 billion budget for 2022 (an increase of appr. 6%). The bills were signed into law by the Chief Minister as the Bangsamoro Appropriations Acts 2021 and 2022. While the annual appropriations laws serve as the basis for operations in the BARMM, according to the BOL national laws and budgeting rules of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) and the Department of Interior and Local

Government (DILG) continue to apply. It is important to define the necessary rules and working arrangements to achieve alignment and to ensure that funds are transmitted to the BARMM in time to facilitate their anticipated use respecting the provisions outlined in the BOL.

The transfer of the Block Grant follows a circuitous route before it reaches the BARMM. Funds are transferred from the DBM to the Central Office of the Bureau of the Treasury (BOT), from there they are routed through BOT Region XII and the BOT in Maguindanao Province before they finally reach the BARMM Treasury. This is not in line with the BOL which specifies that funds should be appropriated automatically, directly and comprehensively (Sections 17/18, Article XII). Furthermore, it is problematic for financial planning in the BARMM that the Block Grant is only released on a monthly basis. The matter is still under discussion at the IFPB.

The Mandanas-Garcia Supreme Court ruling will result in a projected increase in the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) of Local Government Units (LGUs) beginning in 2022. This will affect the Block Grant calculation for the BARMM which is based on a 5% share of the net national internal revenue tax collection less the IRA of LGUs. In consequence, Block Grant allocations to the BARMM could be reduced by an estimated 10-15%.

It is therefore all the more important to reinforce financial planning and management in the BARMM, by setting up mechanisms to monitor funding flows, by ensuring enhanced coordination with the Central Government and LGUs, and by building institutional capacity. Priority should be given to setting up the Bangsamoro Revenue Office and to adopting the Revenue Code.

The sharing of taxes collected by the National Government in the BARMM of 25% national portion and 75% Bangsamoro Government portion as defined in the BOL (Art XII, Section 10) has not yet been implemented, the old ARMM formula of 30%/70% still applies.

Spending out of the Special Development Fund (SDF) allocation has only been partially activated, and needs to be programmed by the Bangsamoro Planning and Development Authority (BPDA) on the basis of the Bangsamoro Development Plan.

There has been no progress yet on the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources, the revenues of which, in the case of oil and gas, are to be shared jointly equally with the National Government.

Grants / loans / official development assistance (ODA)

The FAB sets forth that the Bangsamoro shall have the authority to receive grants and donations from foreign sources. The Annex on Power Sharing lists receiving grants and donations as an exclusive power of the Bangsamoro Government while the Annex on Revenue Generation and

Wealth Sharing states that grants from donors shall be received directly by the Bangsamoro Government. The same applies to loans except those requiring sovereign guaranty, which require Central Government approval.

In variance to the agreements, the BOL demands that acceptance of grants and donations shall be subject to prior clearance and approval by the President or his authorized representative.

The Intergovernmental Fiscal Policy Board (IFPB) during its second meeting on 5 February 2021 cleared rules under which the BARMM may accept foreign grants and donations. Under these rules the Bangsamoro government is required to notify the Department of Finance (DOF) when it starts talks with potential foreign donors, thus providing lead time for coordinating with the Central Government in preparing for receiving grants. It would facilitate matters if, once fundamental approval by the DOF has been obtained, the BTA is in a position to deal with donors directly.

iii. Normalization Track

The gradual normalization of previously conflict-affected areas and their transformation into peaceful and progressive communities forms an essential part of the peace agreements.

The normalization process incorporates (i) security aspects which include transitional components, decommissioning of MILF forces, redeployment of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), policing, and disbandment of private armed groups (PAGs); ii) socio-economic development programs for decommissioned combatants and their communities; (iii) transitional justice and reconciliation; and (iv) confidence-building measures including amnesty and camps transformation. The implementation of the normalization track is closely tied to the progress in the political track. In particular, the CAB commits the Parties to nurture the integrity of the whole peace process.

Security Situation

Focused operations were carried out against the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) in Maguindanao, the Dawlah Islamiya (DI) in Lanao del Sur and the Sulu-based Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) by security forces as part of a strategy to rein in the activities of these groups. DI and ASG are affiliated with ISIS. Disputes among clans (so-called *ridos*) frequently occur particularly in Maguindanao and Lanao del Sur.

The annual trend of armed skirmishes between GPH forces and the MILF has been close to zero since the signing of the FAB in 2012. Nevertheless, protests continue to be filed by both sides with some regularity. Avoiding misunderstandings and more open communication can help to address such incidents. In general, there is a sound spirit of cooperation between the GPH and the MILF which finds expression in joint efforts to counter terrorist groups, as well

as collaboration on peace advocacy and conflict resolution. The ceasefire mechanisms under the peace agreements continue to fulfill their useful role.

In support to improving the security situation in the BARMM, the provincial LGUs of Basilan, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, and Sulu are implementing programs on the reduction and management of small arms and light weapons (SALWs) in partnership with the Joint Normalization Committee (JNC), supported by OPAPP.

On 24 May 2021, the Bangsamoro Government organized the first Bangsamoro Peace and Security Summit for Local Development. It was an opportunity for the Bangsamoro government to assert its role as a partner for security in the region. The Summit committed the GPH and the MILF to adhere to ceasefire protocols and to enhance cooperation and coordination, to the continued deployment of Joint Peace and Security Teams (JPSTs), and towards declaring terrorist groups unprepared for dialogue as *persona non grata*.

There are concerns that the BARMM could witness an increase in election-related violence in the run-up to the May 2022 polls. It is timely in this respect that the authorities have stepped up efforts towards the disbandment of private armed groups (PAGs) and collection of loose firearms. MILF Chair and Bangsamoro Interim Chief Minister Ahod Ebrahim in a meeting with AFP Western Mindanao Command (WESTMINCOM) chief Maj. Gen. Alfredo Rosario Jr. committed on 15 October 2021 to support the peaceful conduct of the 2022 elections.

Land issues have not been addressed concretely by the peace process mechanisms, nor to date by the BARMM/BTA. Land disputes and accusations of land grabbing and land dispossession are an ongoing and constant threat to peace in BARMM. There are many areas of potential flashpoints across the region, particularly in areas with untitled land in the vicinity of long-established MILF base commands.

The IP community in the BARMM are particularly vulnerable to security incidents resulting in displacements. It is important that dispute resolution mechanisms work in a coordinated way to address these concerns, including engagement down to the barangay level.

Resource mobilization for normalization

Item I (on Resource Mobilization) of the Annex on Normalization provides that:

- 1. The GPH shall provide the necessary funding for the normalization process.*
- 2. The Parties agree to allow either party to access funds from donors for the operations of the different mechanisms under the normalization process to supplement the budgetary requirements provided by the GPH.*

The GPH set up the Inter-Cabinet Cluster Mechanism on Normalization (ICCMN) through EO 79 on 24 April 2019 with the aim to ensure timely, appropriate and efficient delivery of the

normalization program. The ICCMN combines relevant member agencies with the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) serving as the secretariat to implement programs for combatant and non-combatant elements of the MILF, the families of decommissioned combatants, and other vulnerable individuals and sectors residing in the BARMM, including the six recognized MILF camps. Funding is to be included in the budgets of ICCMN members.

Partly as a result of limited fiscal space due to the pandemic, such funding has not been forthcoming as expected. As explained by Secretary Galvez at a Senate budget hearing on 15 September 2021, OPAPP's budget requests have been significantly cut back by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) for 2021 and 2022, forcing reprioritizations of critical programs in support of the peace process.

The BOL makes a provision for a Special Development Fund (SDF) to the Bangsamoro Government for the rebuilding, rehabilitation and development of its conflict-affected communities for a total amount of PhP50 billion spread over a period of 10 years (i.e., PhP5 billion per year). The utilization of funds has to be in accordance with the Bangsamoro Development Plan. On 4 November 2020 the BARMM launched the "Bangsamoro Development Plan 2020 - 2022" in Cotabato City with the ultimate goal of uplifting the lives of the Bangsamoro and establishing the foundations of self-governance through moral governance. The 366-page document provides strategies to ensure the recovery and rehabilitation of areas long affected by armed conflict and stresses the importance of national government support to the normalization process. So far allocations under the SDF have only been partly released.

Following the issuance of the Special Authority from the Office of the President on 3 December 2020, the GPH, through the OPAPP and the Department of Finance (DOF), and the World Bank signed the Memorandum of Understanding for the operationalization of the Bangsamoro Normalization Trust Fund (BNTF) on 19 March 2021. The BNTF is a multi-donor trust fund specifically created by the Parties to support the normalization process. The World Bank was selected as the fund manager. The BNTF Steering Committee conducted its first meeting on 22 October 2021.

Policing

Policing is of outstanding importance for the successful completion of the peace process. The FAB clarifies that law enforcement and maintaining peace and order is the primary function of the police force for the Bangsamoro. It calls for a police force for and of the Bangsamoro. It further calls for a professional police service, civilian in character and free from partisan control.

Provision of policing is of particular significance in relation to other components of the normalization process. The agreements stipulate that the establishment of the police force is

linked to phasing out transitional mechanisms of the peace process like the JPSTs. Policing is also closely linked to decommissioning which requires first and foremost a stable security environment. Agreed policing should be in place before the final phase of decommissioning.

The FAB Annex on Power Sharing lists public order and safety as a concurrent power, and provides that the Bangsamoro Government shall have primary responsibility over public order and safety within the Bangsamoro. However, public order and safety was shifted from concurrent to national competence under the BOL out of concern that the respective clause in the FAB was inconsistent with the 1987 Philippine Constitution. Furthermore, already devolved powers of operational control and general supervision over the police force to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) were removed from the competence of the BARMM. This is in contradiction to the Annex on Power Sharing which states that all powers of the ARMM shall be transferred to the BARMM.

The FAB calls on the Parties to continue negotiations on the form, functions and relationship of the police force of the Bangsamoro, with the aim to arrive at an agreed policing in the Bangsamoro. This agreement has not yet been reached.

As outlined in the FAB an Independent Commission on Policing (ICP) was set up to recommend appropriate policing for the Bangsamoro. The ICP submitted its report in April 2014 which placed paramount emphasis on community policing and accountability. What ensued was a debate over how much authority should be delegated by the Central Government to the Bangsamoro police, in particular whether the police should be integrated into existing national structures or enjoy a certain degree of regional autonomy. What transpired under the BOL was the creation of a Police Regional Office in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region, the PNP PRO-BAR, under direct operational control and supervision of the Philippine National Police (PNP), headed by a Regional Director.

Section 2, Article XI of the BOL allows for the entry of MILF and MNLF members into the PNP. It also provides that the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) may waive age, height, and educational attainment requirements within a period of 5 years from the ratification of the BOL on 21 January 2019 on condition that the educational attainment shall be complied within 15 years from entry.

The question of finalizing guidelines for the entry of MILF/MNLF into the PRO-BAR was referred to a Technical Working Group (TWG) under the IGRB at the request of the MILF (even though, strictly speaking, under the peace agreements the Joint Normalization Committee is mandated to coordinate the process of normalization and to resolve all disputes before elevation to the Panels). No agreement has been reached yet, and discussions continue on numbers, the place of employment of recruits and the question of whether the expiry date of the waiver on entry requirements should be adjusted to account of the time that has passed since the ratification of the BOL.

The FAB Annex on Normalization further states that the BTA shall have substantial participation in choosing the Head and in the deployment of the PNP in the Bangsamoro, the BOL reflects this by calling for the involvement of the Chief Minister. (Section 4, Article XI). So far this consultation requirement has not been implemented.

The MILF continues to aim for a spirit of policing as defined in the Annex on Normalization and favours a police force rooted in the community. The MILF believes that its recruits can benefit the PNP due to their local knowledge to help manage the security situation in the region.

The Bangsamoro government has committed to develop good relations with the PNP PRO-BAR, for instance by funding the construction of several police stations. The PNP PRO-BAR appears to coordinate well with CCCH and AHJAG, and there is also regular collaboration with Provincial Peace and Order Councils. The PNP is offering expertise on *ridos*, but there are no specific plans for community policing in the BARMM.

There is an institutional structure in the BARMM to deal with security issues. The Ministry of Interior and Local Government (MILG) has supervisory functions on police matters within LGUs and the Ministry of Public Order and Security (MPOS) has supervising functions in maintaining public order. But the actual involvement of the BTA in security matters has been limited overall. Without a closer involvement in the management of the police force, the Bangsamoro Government lacks effectiveness in conducting important tasks in the security field, for instance in combating extremism. This represents a major limitation in regional autonomy.

Transitional components of normalization

The peace agreements call for a partnership between the GPH and the MILF to work together to secure peace on the ground.

This is to be achieved through a number of joint mechanisms, notably the Joint Normalization Committee (JNC) which has the task to coordinate the different processes of normalization, the Joint Peace and Security Committee (JPSC) which is charged with coordinating the security component of the normalization process, and the Joint Peace and Security Teams (JPSTs), which are responsible for maintaining peace and stability of areas mutually identified by the Parties. These transitional mechanisms shall be in place at least until the police force for the Bangsamoro is fully organized and operational.

The JNC and the JPSC conducted the third batch of JPST training for 5 JPSTs from September to October 2021. This brings the total number of trained JPSTs to 20, 14 of which are currently deployed. Each JPST is composed of contingents from the AFP and the PNP with 15 members for the GPH side, and 15 members from the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF-MILF). The JPSTs are designed as a unique, innovative, and temporary measure for the transition period before a police force with MILF/MNLF participation will take over. They have played

a vital role in ensuring the security of residents within the six government-acknowledged MILF camps during the second phase of the decommissioning process. Furthermore, the JPSC and the JPSTs have been instrumental in facilitating clan dispute (*rido*) settlement.

It should be noted though that there is a wide discrepancy in expectations on size and role of the JPST network. The initially agreed target number of 200 JPSTs is far from being reached, due to lack of available budgets and limited training capacities. Further to note that JPSTs do not have law enforcement functions. Nevertheless, an effective JPST presence on the ground could be one of the most visible assurances of the benefits of peace.

In as far as joint mechanisms to ensure peace are concerned, the Agreement for the General Cessation of Hostilities signed on 18 July 1997 forms an integral part of the CAB. Of particular relevance here are the Coordinating Committee on Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH) and the Ad-Hoc Joint Action Group (AHJAG) which, together with the International Monitoring Team (IMT) are responsible for upholding the ceasefire agreement until the full decommissioning of MILF forces.

These existing ceasefire coordination mechanisms continue to demonstrate their usefulness, in particular linked to the coordination of law enforcement operations. On 30 July 2021, the Parties signed the revised TOR of the IMT.

Decommissioning / socio-economic development programs

Decommissioning is perhaps the most challenging part of the normalization process. The MILF has committed to carry out a graduated program of decommissioning of its forces on the basis of a comprehensive needs assessment for its members and their communities. An Independent Decommissioning Body (IDB) composed of foreign and local experts was set up in 2014 to oversee the process, including inventory, verification and validation of MILF members and weapons.

In parallel the JNC was mandated to develop a program for reduction and management of small arms and light weapons (SALWs) of individuals and groups.

The FAB Annex on Normalization specifies that the decommissioning of MILF forces shall be parallel and commensurate to the implementation of all the agreements of the Parties. This is of great importance as many MILF combatants and commanders are reluctant to hand in their weapons given the many loose firearms, the presence of private armed groups (PAGs) and the high incidence of clan disputes in the BARMM. It is therefore essential for the successful completion of the decommissioning process that other components of the normalization process, such as policing, disbandment of PAGs and reduction of small arms and light weapons are pursued in parallel.

The MILF committed to decommission 40,000 combatants and 7,500 weapons. As a first step, a largely symbolic and ceremonial turnover of 145 combatants and 75 weapons took place in 2015. The second phase took place following ratification of the BOL between August 2019

and March 2020, involving 12,000 combatants (30%) and 2,100 weapons. The MILF submitted its list of 14,000 combatants for Phase 3 to the Independent Decommissioning Body (IDB) in December 2020.

For Phase 3 of the decommissioning process which started on 8 November 2021, the Parties agreed that the procedure for a total of 14,000 combatants will be done on the basis of same-day verification and decommissioning per Assembly and Processing Area (APA). A total of 7,200 combatants were scheduled for decommissioning in 2021 and the remaining 6,800 in 2022.

The IDB undertook preparations for Phase 3 by taking into account the need to respect Covid-19 related health protocols. The pandemic will likely affect the length of time required for the Phase 3 to be completed.

Decommissioned combatants, their families, and their communities should receive socio-economic development packages programmed by the Task Force for Decommissioned Combatants and their Communities (TFDCC). These packages comprise interventions on social protection, capacity building, livelihood/employment assistance, and social infrastructure. OPAPP is engaged in concluding Memoranda of Agreement (MOAs) with government agencies to allow former combatants to participate in their respective programs.

What follows is an overview on the current status of delivery of socio-economic packages to decommissioned combatants.

Social Protection

- Combatants to be decommissioned under Phase 3 are provided with transitional cash assistance worth PhP100,000 each, through the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), similar to what was immediately provided to decommissioned combatants under Phases 1 and 2. Decommissioned combatants under Phases 2 and 3 will also be included in the Health Insurance Program under the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PHIC or PhilHealth) which is targeted to be rolled out in 2022.

Capacity Development

- A total of 334 decommissioned combatants and their next-of-kin have graduated from the Technical-Vocational Education Training (TVET) Program under the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA) with the assistance of the Ministry of Basic, Higher, and Technical Education (MBHTE) Technical Education Sector. They took training on pastry-making, dressmaking, electrical installation and maintenance, and process food fermentation. Another batch composed of 167 decommissioned combatants and their next-of-kin underwent training and graduated before the end of the year.

- A total of 330 out of the targeted 450 decommissioned combatants have completed the Values Transformation Training (VTT) implemented by the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA). The Ministry of Basic, Higher, and Technical Education (MBHTE) is implementing the Alternative Learning System (ALS) and the Study Grant Program for decommissioned combatants and their next-of-kin. In April 2021, the OPAPP entered into an MOA with the Bangsamoro Government for the implementation of the ALS and the Bangsamoro Grants-in-Aid Higher Education Program (BGIAHEP) for decommissioned combatants and their families.

Livelihood/Employment Assistance

- In March 2021, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) launched a PhP16.5-million Mechanized Solid Waste and Segregation System Project in Butig, Lanao del Sur. This aims to create employment and livelihood opportunities for decommissioned combatants and out-of-school youth in the area.
- The DTI also turned over 31 rice mills to MILF cooperatives in the six previously acknowledged MILF camps in June 2021 as part of its Peaceful Return Aggressive Inclusion on Social Entrepreneurship (PRAISE) Program.

Social Infrastructure

- The National Irrigation Administration (NIA) completed four communal irrigation systems in communities of decommissioned combatants in Maguindanao to be turned over in December 2021: in (1) Tuayan, Shariff Aguak; (2) Langkong, Matanog; (3) Upper Tuayan, Datu Hoffer Ampatuan; and (4) Butig, Lanao del Sur. Three more irrigation systems are targeted to be completed within the first quarter of 2022.
- Six rural health units with birthing facilities are being constructed by the Department of Health (DOH) and the Ministry of Health (MOH) and are targeted to be completed within the first quarter of 2022. OPAPP entered into a tripartite MOA with the DOH and the MOH in November 2020 for their construction.

Further to note that the TFDCC conducted a re-engagement process for decommissioned combatants under Phases 1 and 2 until March 2021. A total of 8,217 (67.7%) out of 12,145 decommissioned combatants from Maguindanao, North Cotabato, South Cotabato, Sarangani, Lanao provinces, Zamboanga peninsula, Bukidnon, and Sultan Kudarat were reengaged. The provision of socio-economic development packages for the 12,145 combatants decommissioned in Phases 1 and 2 are still pending.

On 15 September Secretary Galvez clarified in the Senate that the amount of PhP1 million earmarked for each of the decommissioned MILF combatants represented the estimated monetary value of the socioeconomic package they are meant to receive. Nevertheless public

statements on the PhP1 million have raised expectations. The additional non-cash support from national government agencies has only been provided in piece-meal fashion.

The MILF is still looking for clear answers on the remaining package and argues that it is difficult to convince its combatants to join the decommissioning process considering this lack of clarity.

To ensure the success of the third phase and also for those decommissioned earlier, the expectations of combatants and their communities need to be managed. It is critical to have clear information on what interventions they will receive, by when, and through what mechanism.

Redeployment of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)

The Annex on Normalization states that the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) shall redeploy its units and troops from or within the Bangsamoro, consistent with a normal and peaceful life and alongside progress in other aspects of normalization.

The FAB Annex on Normalization further calls for coordination between the Central Government and the Bangsamoro Government in the movement of the AFP in the Bangsamoro.

Planning for redeployment of the AFP has not far advanced yet. The JNC and the AFP are crafting the criteria for redeployment. They are also preparing for the conduct of a joint security assessment and an inventory of AFP units and troops.

To note that redeployment does not mean complete pulling out of troops. Necessary defense and security installations will be retained to avoid a security vacuum in the Bangsamoro.

Disbanding Private Armed Groups (PAGs)

The FAB Annex on Normalization calls on the GPH in coordination with the MILF to conduct an assessment and devise a plan for the disbandment of PAGs as part of the normalization process, to be undertaken through the JNC.

The National Task Force for the Disbandment of PAGs (NTF-DPAGs) was established already in 2015 and charged with policy, planning and implementation of the program of disbandment of PAGs. Following approval of implementing rules and operational guidelines the reactivated NTF-DPAGs convened on 4 November 2020 chaired by Interior and Local Government Secretary Eduardo M. Año.

The conduct of a comprehensive security assessment and an inventory of armed groups is ongoing. A DPAGs roll-out to raise awareness and capacity of LGUs was conducted in Region IX in May 2021. The roll-out will also be conducted in all LGUs in the BARMM as well as in Regions X, XI and XII. To note that the implementation phase is to include firearms control and management.

OPAPP entered into MOAs with DILG, AFP and PNP for the program of disbandment of PAGs. OPAPP further entered into MOAs with Provincial Local Government Units (PLGUs) in the BARMM for programs of management of SALWs.

According to Secretary Ano, the NTF-DPAGs disbanded 14 PAGs in the BARMM and Region XII by mid-December 2021 since its reactivation.

These measures are timely, as the continued presence of PAGs could negatively affect the security situation and interfere with decommissioning and electoral processes. Dealing with PAGs is therefore a critical element in ensuring lasting peace in the Bangsamoro.

An "official" list of PAGs is not yet available. In addition to active PAGs there is also a large number of potential PAGs which could be activated at short notice.

During the press conference of the NTF-DPAGs on 29 October 2021 in General Santos City, MILF Chair and Bangsamoro Government Chief Minister Ahod "Murad" Ebrahim and MNLF Chair Muslimin Sema expressed support to the efforts of the National Government towards the disbandment of PAGs.

As there is no BARMM participation on the NTF-DPAGs, the Parties would be well-advised to clarify an appropriate mechanism for cooperation with BTA authorities and MILF on implementation of disbandment programs.

Transitional justice and reconciliation (TJR)

Transitional Justice and Reconciliation (TJR) is at the heart of the peace agreements. The recognition of the justness and legitimacy of the cause of the Bangsamoro people and their right to identity and human dignity is prominently reflected in the CAB. As part of the FAB the Parties agreed to work out a program for TJR to address the legitimate grievances of the Bangsamoro people, to correct historical injustices and to address human rights violations. For this purpose, the Parties created the Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) to undertake a study and recommend to the Panels appropriate mechanisms for TJR. One of the main recommendations of the TJRC was to create a National Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission for the Bangsamoro (NTJRCB) to oversee a National Dealing With the Past strategy and to develop specific initiatives related to historical memory, impunity, promotion of accountability and rule of law, to address marginalization through land dispossession and to promote Healing and Reconciliation in the Bangsamoro.

The Inter-Cabinet Cluster Mechanism on Normalization (ICCMN) took the lead in the implementation of the recommendations provided for in the report of the TJRC by setting up a TJR Cluster. Relevant agencies were convened under the ICCMN to work towards the adoption and implementation of the TJR Program for the BARMM.

Complementing this the BOL (Section 1, Article IX) calls on the Bangsamoro Parliament to set up a regional mechanism. In consequence the BTA adopted Resolution 58 proposing the creation of a Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission in the BARMM. The Bangsamoro Human Rights Commission was mandated to take on transitional justice initiatives in the interim.

The BTA, through its resolution 56, also called on the National Government to create the NTJRCB and the implementation of a related program. Actions to ensure TJR promise to prevent escalation of grievances and future conflicts. This should be seen as a national task.

During its fifth meeting on 30 March 2021, the ICCMN, chaired by Cabinet Secretary Karlo Alexei B. Nograles and Presidential Peace Adviser Secretary Carlito G. Galvez, Jr., approved the proposed TJR roadmap drafted by its TJR Cluster. It has been submitted for approval of the Peace Implementing Panels and is pending completion of review by the MILF. The proposed roadmap includes programs, projects, and activities committed by the member-agencies of the ICCMN corresponding to the specific recommendations of the Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) in its main report.

In November and December 2020, the GPH-MILF Technical Working Group on Transitional Justice and Reconciliation (TWG-TJR) conducted a series of information, education, and communication (IEC) campaign and community dialogues in Camp Darapanan, Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao; Malisbong, Palimbang, Sultan Kudarat; and Manili, Carmen, North Cotabato. The OPAPP also conducted community dialogues with non-Moro IPs on 10-12 December 2021 in the municipalities of Datu Saudi Ampatuan, South Upi, and Datu Blah Sinsuat in Maguindanao to discuss land-related issues. Another round of community dialogues was conducted in Camps Abubakar, Bilal, and Busrah in May 2021 to solicit specific recommendations on TJR.

Land dispossession is at the heart of the Bangsamoro struggle. The CAB and the BOL both acknowledge marginalization through land dispossession as a root cause of conflict that must be jointly addressed by the National Government and the Bangsamoro people. These issues were examined in great detail under the TJRC, and their main report and sub-reports included a set of constructive recommendations to address these root causes of conflict. In particular, the TJRC recommended the creation of a Sub-Commission on Land Dispossession in the Bangsamoro “in accordance with international standards pertaining to the right to reparation, which acknowledges the right of individual victims or their beneficiaries to reparation and the duty of the State to provide satisfaction.” No action has been taken in this respect.

The Philippine government is still to pass a law that will create the NTJRCB, although House Bill (HB) 5669, authored by Representative Christopher Belmonte, was already adopted by the House Special Committee on Peace, Reconciliation and Unity in September 2018. It was re-filed in August 2019 as HB 4003. TJR is a crucial element of bringing lasting peace and justice

to the region and legislators in Manila should live up to supporting this commitment. HB 4003 should be considered as a priority bill.

Camps transformation

As part of the confidence-building measures under the Annex on Normalization, the Parties agreed to undertake necessary measures for the transformation of the six jointly acknowledged MILF camps into peaceful and productive communities. These camps are (1) Camp Abubakar as-Siddique, (2) Camp Omar ibn al-Khattab, and (3) Camp Badre in Maguindanao; (4) Camp Busrah Somiorang in Lanao del Sur; (5) Camp Bilal in Lanao del Norte; and finally (6) Camp Rajamuda in North Cotabato and Maguindanao.

The Joint Task Forces for Camps Transformation (JTFCTs) partnered with the Bangsamoro Planning and Development Authority (BPDA) to formulate the Camps Transformation Plan (CTP) in 2020 based on a series of camp area assessments and community profiling. BPDA-BARMM turned over the draft CTP to the JTFCTs on 28 January 2021. The 6-year plan (2021-2026), which includes planning for socioeconomic programs, serves as a roadmap to implement the transformation of six MILF camps.

The JNC approved the CTP on 16 February 2021. The CTP was presented to GPH and MILF Peace Implementing Panels on 26 February 2021 and was approved by the Panels on 9 November 2021 along with the Camps Transformation Investment Program (CTIP).

The main challenge for the future is to mobilize resources for implementation following CTP approval. IPs should be actively associated in the process as some camps are located in areas claimed as ancestral domains.

Amnesty

As part of CBMs listed under the Annex on Normalization the GPH committed itself to take immediate steps through amnesty, pardon and other available processes towards the resolution of cases of persons charged with or convicted of crimes and offences connected to the armed conflict in Mindanao with the aim to facilitate healing of the wounds of conflict and the return to normal life.

On 5 February 2021, President Duterte issued Proclamation No. 1090, “granting amnesty to members of the MILF who have committed crimes punishable under the Revised Penal Code and special penal laws in furtherance of their political beliefs”. Similar proclamations were also issued for members of other armed groups, including the MNLF. Executive Order No. 125, which creates the National Amnesty Commission (NAC), was issued the same day.

The NAC will be composed of a chairperson, two regular members, and 4 ex-officio members (by virtue of some other office or position), i.e., Defense Secretary, Justice Secretary, Interior Secretary, and Presidential Peace Adviser.

The House of Representatives adopted House Concurrent Resolution No. 12 on 19 May 2021 in concurrence with Proclamation No. 1090. House Speaker Velasco described this as a "significant milestone toward reconciliation and lasting peace in the country." The Senate adopted House Concurrent Resolution No. 12 without amendment on 24 January 2022. At the end of the reporting period the appointment of members of the NAC remained pending.

While waiting for the process of granting amnesty to begin, safe conduct passes are being issued to some MILF leaders to allow their uninterrupted participation in the BTA and the Bangsamoro Government and in the GPH-MILF peace process mechanisms. Safe conduct passes are only a temporary solution.

The Amnesty Commission established under EO No. 125 is a critical element of the peace process, and part of the core legacy of President Duterte. It can only begin operations after concurrence of both the House of Representatives and the Senate. Once this is in place, the NAC will only have one year to exercise its authority. This is a critical element of the peace process with far-reaching effects and should be addressed with the necessary urgency. The number of pending cases against key BIAF-MILF commanders could become serious obstacles for the decommissioning process or for the participation of concerned individuals in elections.

3. Other developments

Covid-19 pandemic

According to a Socioeconomic Impact Assessment of Covid-19 in the BARMM carried out by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the BARMM, which was enjoying steady economic gains before 2020, was disproportionately impacted by the pandemic in terms of socio-economic development resulting in an aggravation of existing and emerging vulnerabilities in the region.

While the BTA was able to manage and contain the spread of the Covid-19 pandemic, indirect impacts including restrictions in mobility due to the need of following health protocols affected the livelihoods of many, especially the most vulnerable communities.

As a result, the pandemic has significantly added to the BARMM's challenges in the transition, since resources needed to be re-allocated and precious time in the development of the region has been lost.

Rehabilitation of Marawi City

The siege of Marawi, in which more than 1,000 persons died and an estimated 350,000 persons were displaced, unfolded from May to October 2017. The events at the time reinforced the logic of taking renewed steps towards passage of the BOL as an instrument to advance the implementation of the peace agreements. Due to its rich Islamic heritage the rehabilitation of the city has a strong symbolic value for the Muslim community in Mindanao.

The Central Government took responsibility for the rehabilitation of the city through the Task Force Bangon Marawi (TFBM). The TFBM announced December 2021 as the deadline for completing reconstruction but has since corrected this to the first half of 2022. TFBM placed particular emphasis on development of infrastructure and public utilities (i.e., roads, water, electricity, mosques, schools, drainage system, barangay multipurpose centers, sports stadium) and claims that completion of city housing projects is also on track. On 16 October 2021 some 600 permanent housing units were ready, with 80-90% of the target figure of 2,800 units projected to be finished by December 2021. This compares to some 126,000 persons still living in temporary housing. Civil society organisations like the Moro Consensus Group have expressed criticism over this approach, arguing that return of residents to the Most Affected Area (MAA) should have been given priority.

A Marawi Compensation Bill was adopted in the House of Representatives on 6 September 2021. A corresponding bill was passed by the Senate on 31 January 2022. Important decisions need to be taken, including the overall size of the compensation package and the range of individual compensations. The compensations are of particular importance for displaced residents who do not have the necessary funds for reconstruction of their damaged properties. By October 2021, only 2,400 applications for building permits were put forward. While most sectors of the MAA have been opened for returning residents, issues related to property rights and building safety remain relevant. In this context, it was high time that a Land Dispute Resolution Committee was set up with involvement of the BARMM chaired by Human Settlements Minister Hamid Aminoddin D. Barra. The BARMM has also provided support for residents applying for building permits.

Land remains a central challenge for the MAA. Last year's BTA Special Committee on Marawi report identified the need to craft appropriate alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms, and the need for the IGRB to be engaged on this issue, as land management and land registration remains within the jurisdiction of the National Government.

The rehabilitation of Marawi should also be regarded as an opportunity to rebuild the social fabric of the community so that it can protect itself against radicalization and is empowered to promote peace and reconciliation. If not handled properly, extremist forces could again grow in strength in the years to come. Reportedly Marawi residents feel disappointed over the slow pace of return to normal life.

4. Comment

The TPMT believes that the peace agreements, the CAB and the FAB, represent a historic achievement by laying out a comprehensive framework in addressing the complex origins of the Bangsamoro cause with the aim of precluding the possibility of armed hostilities once and for all.

The agreements combine and counterbalance two fundamental concepts: on the one hand the idea of meaningful self-governance for the Bangsamoro, as expressed in the establishment of the BARMM as a political entity, on the other hand the gradual normalization of conflict-affected areas and their transformation into peaceful and progressive communities. This approach is reflected in the two pillars which support the implementation of the agreements - the political track and the normalization track. Both tracks should complement and reinforce each other. The CAB commits both Parties to nurture the integrity of the whole peace process.

The ratification of the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL) through a plebiscite on 21 January 2019 created the BARMM as a legal political entity by defining its basic structure of government, including for the transition period. While several important CAB provisions have been removed from the BOL or were amended (see TPMT 5th Public Report), both CAB and BOL share the same objectives of achieving lasting peace on the basis of justice, as well as genuine and meaningful self-governance for the Bangsamoro.

The BOL was conceived as a piece of legislation to implement the peace agreements. It cannot replace or substitute the agreements which remain in force until an exit agreement is concluded and signed by the two Parties. The agreements therefore continue to form the basis for assessing whether the objectives of the peace process have been delivered.

As the peace process entered its advanced implementation stage following the inaugural session of the BTA on 29 March 2019, it soon became evident that the allocated 3-year timeframe in the BOL for establishing a new autonomous political entity was very ambitious. The complexity of the task of establishing a new political and administrative entity was significant. The constraints imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic added considerably to this challenge.

The extension of the transition phase until 2025, if used judiciously, will give the BTA more time to accomplish its priority tasks.

The extension will also allow the Parties - the GPH and the MILF, more space to complete what they originally committed to achieve.

A lot of time has passed since the peace agreements were negotiated. This is a good time to assess what has been accomplished and what remains to be done, and to reflect on commitments at this point.

We note several **positive developments**:

- Both Parties, the GPH and the MILF, continue to demonstrate a very high level of commitment to the peace process.
- The ceasefire agreement between the Parties remains intact as the GPH and the MILF remain committed to preserving the gains of the peace process.
- The BTA is no longer in its infancy. The foundations for effective administrative and legislative structures in the Bangsamoro, including the adoption of priority legislation and institution building, have been laid. This in itself is an outstanding achievement.
- The IGRB continues to meet on a regular basis, thereby assuring regular interaction between the National Government in Manila and the BARMM Government in Cotabato. The IGRB has become an irreplaceable element in defining the working arrangements between the two governments.
- Some important and long-awaited steps were taken in advancing the normalization agenda, in particular the start of the 3rd round of decommissioning, the release of an Amnesty Proclamation and the launching of the Bangsamoro Normalization Trust Fund (BNTF).

At the same time, we observe several **challenges** in important areas of the peace process:

- While achievements on the political track to date are impressive, the BOL includes a large unfinished agenda of legislative, institutional and administrative tasks. Beyond the need for the BTA to complete the work on the priority codes these comprise expanding the revenue capacity of the BARMM, organizing the bureaucracy, building the justice system, protecting and managing natural resources as well as accelerated development efforts, including for conflict-affected and poverty-stricken communities. These tasks should be tackled with energy and determination.
- While the BOL provides the framework for advancing on the political track, implementation of the normalization track is comparatively behind schedule. Unless addressed proactively, the integrity of the peace process risks drifting into a state of imbalance.
- The decommissioning of MILF combatants represents the most important component of the normalization track. Thanks to the determination of both Parties and the professionalism of the IDB the decommissioning process advanced despite the fact that little progress was made in other areas of normalization. For instance, this relates to the absence of agreed policing, lack of clarity on socio-economic packages for decommissioned combatants, and slow progress on camps transformation. Ultimately

progress on decommissioning will remain dependent on other elements of the normalization track being pursued in parallel.

- There has been little movement when it comes to implementing the key recommendations of the TJRC.
- Partly as a result of the pandemic, implementation of programs in the BARMM, including in the field of normalization, was affected by reorientation of priorities resulting in a shortage of funds.
- Finally, we note a tendency for the GPH to act unilaterally without involving the BARMM where this would be pertinent. This applies in particular to the security field. Examples are EO 79 which presents normalization as something the national Government will do for the Bangsamoro, rather than with the Bangsamoro, or failure to consult the Chief Minister on the appointment of the Bangsamoro police chief.

As the peace process enters its final and decisive phase, the TPMT is of the view that **the following aspects should be considered** to ensure a successful outcome:

- It is imperative for the Parties to continue to demonstrate the commitment, perseverance and patience which has achieved so much to this point. Both Parties need to maintain their allegiance to the spirit as well as to the letter of the agreements.
- A peace process is always evolving. The additional three years allowed for peace process implementation provide an opportunity for joint reflection on the achievements to this point, and perhaps an opportunity to adjust and refine the way the peace process is implemented on the basis of the existing agreements. This reflective process can start now.
- Completing the BTA legislative priorities is important to signal to the public that the new Parliament structure works and must serve as a clear demonstration that the political process is on track. Therefore, it is vital that the outstanding priority codes should be passed by the current BTA within the originally determined timeframe.
- Implementation of the normalization track as a key element of the peace process has proven to be difficult and sensitive. It has been carried forward more slowly than expected. Normalization requires synchronized actions in a parallel and commensurate manner involving all its different elements. Everything should be done to speed up and to better coordinate implementation in order to achieve substantial progress by 2025.
- The Covid-19 pandemic has diverted funds away from supporting the peace process. Yet lasting peace in Mindanao is too important to fall victim to the pandemic. Renewed

efforts to secure the necessary resources to sustain the objectives of the peace process, particularly in the normalization field, are essential.

- The MILF has demonstrated its credentials as a reliable partner in the security field. Consultative mechanisms and practical cooperation should be reinforced by which the MILF and the BARMM can contribute more effectively towards building a stable region and advancing the normalization process.
- In order to deliver the peace dividend to all citizens in the Bangsamoro the peace process has to achieve the greatest possible sense of inclusivity. The MILF especially will have to prove their sincerity and willingness to partner with all groups in the region during the transition and beyond, including indigenous peoples' and local politicians.
- Working towards the implementation of key TJRC recommendations is important to offer a path forward towards healing the wounds which have been inflicted over decades of conflict. An independent NTJRCB, as recommended by the TJRC, is required to provide the necessary strategic approach on TJR. This should be national in character, the TJR process should not evolve on two tracks.
- The involvement of international actors in the Bangsamoro peace process has been a unique strength and asset over the decades of negotiation and implementation. The continued involvement of the IMT to help maintaining the ceasefire is crucial. It would also be helpful to reconsider the role of the International Contact Group (ICG) to enrich the current process with fresh ideas as well as international exposure and experience from other journeys towards peace.

In conclusion we would like to put forward the following observations:

The peace agreements, the CAB and the FAB, will remain the cornerstone of peace in the region and offer the best chance of carrying the process forward to a successful conclusion. As the Philippines enters into the formal campaign period for elections in 2022, all stakeholders would be well-advised not to ignore the underlying human, economic and security costs of continued conflict in Mindanao, should the peace process lose momentum or falter.

With the extension now in place the Parties have the opportunity to focus on completing the peace process with renewed vigour and without undue time pressure. However, the challenge of implementing complex peace agreements by 2025 remains enormous and should not be underestimated. The COVID-19 pandemic has not yet been fully overcome. There is no room for complacency.

Creating peace is difficult and takes time. The best guarantee of success is the strongest underlying commitment to peace by both Parties. Building a comprehensive, inclusive and

sustainable peace in Mindanao is the key inheritance which the two Parties can leave to future generations.

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Rebecca “Karen” Tañada

Hüseyin Oruç

Sam Chittick

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Heino Marius

ANNEXES

- I. TPMT mandate, members, and activities**
- II. Terms of Reference of the TPMT**
- III. TPMT Members**
- IV. Calendar of TPMT sessions, November 2020 to January 2022**
- V. Members of the Bangsamoro Transition Authority**

TPMT MANDATE, MEMBERS AND ACTIVITIES

The TPMT was established in July 2013, as foreseen in the respective provisions of the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) and its Annex on Transitional Arrangements and Modalities, as incorporated into the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB), and in line with the Terms of Reference (TOR) of the TPMT agreed by the Panels on 25 January 2013 (Annex II).

The mandate of the TPMT is to monitor, review and assess the implementation of all signed agreements between the parties, primarily the FAB and its Annexes. The TPMT is required to report:

- to the Panel Chairs, in confidence, quarterly and as deemed necessary, providing our observations and recommendations. The Panels are not bound by our recommendations, but shall provide written responses within one month;
- to the public, on a yearly basis or as the TPMT deems necessary, providing our overall assessment of developments in the implementation of the agreements. These public reports are provided to the Panels and the Facilitator for comment and consultation, but the TPMT has the final say on the content of the report.

Our TOR requires that the TPMT shall convene every two months, through until the end of the transition period and the regular operation of the Bangsamoro Government (to occur following the first elections to the Bangsamoro Parliament). At that point, the Panels, together with the Facilitator and the TPMT, shall convene a meeting to review whether “all agreements have been fully implemented”,¹ and shall produce an “Exit Document” officially terminating the peace process between the GPH and the MILF. Our TOR also provides that the TPMT shall work on the basis of consensus, in a spirit of cooperation, confidence-building, and trust; shall have access to all reports and activities connected to the implementation of the agreements; and shall be allowed to observe the meetings of all bodies concerned with the implementation of the agreements. The TPMT’s Internal Rules and Regulations (workplan, code of conduct, security protocols, financial procedures) were submitted to and approved by the Panels between December 2013 and April 2014.

The TPMT has five members – two representatives from Philippine non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and two representatives from international NGOs (one of each being nominated by each Party, all being agreed by the two Parties), and one “eminent international person” (jointly nominated by the Parties) as Chair. The Philippine members are Rebecca “Karen” Tañada (Gaston Z. Ortigas Peace Institute - GZOPI) and Rahib Kudto (United Youth for Peace and Development - UNYPAD); the international members are Huseyin Oruç (IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation) and Sam Chittick (The Asia Foundation). The Chair until

¹See Annex on Transitional Arrangements and Modalities, page 3

April 2019 was Alistair MacDonald (former European Union Ambassador to the Philippines), who sadly passed away on 26 April 2019. On 3 September 2020 the Peace Implementing Panels of the Government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front designated Mr. Heino Marius as Chair of the TPMT. The brief curricula vitae (CVs) of the TPMT members are given in Annex III.

In total, the TPMT has held 42 monitoring sessions starting from its inaugural meeting in Kuala Lumpur in July 2013 (alongside the 38th Formal Exploratory Talks between the Parties). The TPMT convened in the Philippines on two sessions in 2013, six in 2014, seven in 2015, five in 2016, five in 2017, five in 2018, five in 2019, three in 2020, and three in 2020. In 2021, the TPMT convened in February, May, and September, which were all conducted virtually during the Covid-19 pandemic, with a further session planned for December.

During these sessions, the TPMT has met regularly with both Panels and with other bodies associated with the peace process, with senior figures of the GPH and of the MILF, with members of Congress as well as regional and local government officials, members of the Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA) and ministers of the Bangsamoro Government, civil society organisations, and with representatives of the diplomatic community. Some TPMT members also attended as observers and resource speakers in Congressional hearings for the proposed postponement of the first regular elections for the Bangsamoro Government. A calendar of TPMT sessions from November 2020 to October 2021 is provided in Annex III.

TPMT reporting from November 2020 to October 2021, in addition to the sixth Public Report released in October 2020, included brief “Exit Letters” transmitted to the Panels at the close of each TPMT session which provided some immediate observations and recommendations gathered during each of these visits. These Exit Letters are confidential to the Panels.

The TPMT briefed members of the House of Representatives and the Senate during in the context of discussions on the extension of the BARMM transition phase.

Financial support for TPMT activities continues to be provided by the European Union (EU), through a grant-contract administered by the Nonviolent Peaceforce. It may be noted that all TPMT members are providing their services free of charge, with external finance covering only travel, accommodation, per diem, and other operational costs (including modest institutional support to the home organisations of the two local members of the TPMT, which also permitted these organisations to carry out further consultations and research activities with key stakeholder groups in Mindanao and in Manila).

In line with our TOR, this seventh Public Report, covering the period from November 2020 to October 2021, is intended to provide “an overall assessment of developments in the implementation of the Agreements” during this period.

THE THIRD PARTY MONITORING TEAM (TPMT) AND ITS TERMS OF REFERENCE

1. MANDATE

The mandate of the Third Party Monitoring Team (TPMT) is to monitor, review and assess the implementation of all signed agreements, primarily the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro and its Annexes.

2. COMPOSITION

The TPMT is an independent body composed of the following:

- A chair, who shall be an eminent international person and shall act as convenor and spokesperson for the TPMT;
- A representative from a local non-government organization registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, to be nominated by the GPH;
- A representative from a local non-government organization registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, to be nominated by the MILF;
- a representative from an international non-government organization to be nominated by the GPH; and
- a representative from an international non-government organization to be nominated by the MILF.

One or two eminent international persons may be added to the membership of the TPMT as mutually agreed by the Parties. All members shall be mutually acceptable to and agreed upon by the Parties.

Unethical behaviour may be a ground for removal from the TPMT of an individual member upon the recommendation of the body through the Chair and/or the Panels by mutual agreement., In any case, the final decision rests upon the Panels.

3. FUNCTIONS

3.1 The basic functions of the TPMT are to:

- a. Monitor and evaluate the implementation of all Agreements.

- b. Review and assess the progress of the implementation of commitments by both Parties under the Agreements. Towards this end, it shall submit comprehensive periodic reports and updates to both Parties for their appropriate action.
 - c. Communicate to the public the progress and developments in the implementation of the Agreements of the Parties.
- 3.2 At the end of the transition period, upon the regular operation of the Bangsamoro Government, the GPH and MILF Peace Panels, together with the Malaysian Facilitator and the TPMT, shall convene a meeting to review, assess or evaluate the implementation of all agreements and the progress of the transition. An ‘Exit Document’ officially terminating the peace negotiations may be crafted and signed by both Parties if and only when all agreements have been fully implemented.
- 3.3 The TPMT shall have the power to organize its work in the manner it deems most appropriate. It shall, under the direction of the Chair, devise its own tasking, work plans, security and confidentiality protocols, and financial systems in order to comply with requirements imposed by funding sources. It shall also define a code of conduct particularly with respect to the relationship between its members and their organizational affiliations. These shall be contained in the TPMT’s Internal Rules and Regulations which shall be submitted to the Panels for their approval.
- 3.4 The TPMT shall work on the basis of consensus. In reporting, any disagreements must be noted. The TPMT shall commit to work in the spirit of cooperation, confidence-building and trust among themselves and with their external relations.
- 3.5 Access to meetings, activities, informants, documents and data

The members of the TPMT shall have access to all reports and activities connected to the implementation of the Agreements. It shall directly coordinate with the concerned bodies and individuals in order to accomplish its functions and achieve its objectives.

The TPMT shall be allowed to observe the meetings of the Transition Commission and other bodies concerned with the implementation of the Agreements, subject to guidelines that the respective bodies may set.

4. REGULAR MEETINGS

The TPMT shall convene every two months and as they deem necessary.

5. REPORTING

The TPMT shall submit confidential written reports to the chairpersons of the two Peace Panels and to the facilitator, quarterly and as deemed necessary. The reports shall contain the TPMT's observations and recommendations. The Parties are not bound by the recommendations but shall submit written responses to the TPMT, furnishing a copy to the facilitator, within one month from receipt.

The TPMT shall produce a public written report yearly or as it deems necessary, providing an overall assessment of developments in the implementation of the Agreements. Before issuing a public report, the TPMT shall submit it to the Parties and to the Facilitator for comment and consultation. The TPMT may consider the comments of the Parties but without prejudice to its independent discretion on what to publish.

6. CONFIDENTIALITY

All information, data or opinions gathered, generated or exchanged in connection with the work of the TPMT shall be treated with utmost consideration for the safety and security of the source and the integrity of the peace process. Critical and/or confidential information as defined by the TPMT may not be divulged to their respective organizations and other entities.

7. ADMINISTRATIVE AND SUPPORT ARRANGEMENTS

The TPMT shall have an office and support staff / secretariat commensurate to its technical, operational and administrative requirements. It may engage the assistance of experts in the exercise of its monitoring and assessment functions.

8. FUNDING

Funding for the operations of the TPMT shall be independently sourced as jointly decided by the Parties in coordination with the TPMT. This may take the form of several funding streams or one funding source.

To address the problem of a possible gap between the formal establishment of the TPMT and its longer-term funding support, the Parties undertake to find modalities for short-term bridge funding for the initial activities of the TPMT. Potential organizational members of the TPMT may indicate how they would cover any "bridge" period.

9. DURATION

The TPMT shall be formed by the Parties not later than one month after the signing of these Terms of Reference. It shall continue to exist until an Exit Agreement is reached.

Done this 25th day of January 2013 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

FOR THE GPH: MIRIAM CORONEL-FERRER GPH Panel Chair	FOR THE MILF: MOHAGHER IQBAL MILF Panel Chair
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SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF:

TENGGU DATO' AB GHAFAR TENGGU MOHAMED
Malaysian Facilitator

TPMT Members**Heino Marius**tpmt.marius@gmail.com

(Chair)

Heino Marius, a German national, earned a master's degree in economics from Hamburg University and a post-graduate degree in development economics from the German Development Institute Berlin. He stated his career in Indonesia working on management and small enterprise development with the International Labour Organization. He joined the European Commission in 1993 and served in European Union (EU) Delegations in Ethiopia and India. Since 2000 he held various positions at EU headquarters in Brussels, covering external relations with Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Southeast Asia. Mr. Marius retired from the services of the EU in February 2020.

Rahib Kudtotpmt.kudto@gmail.com

(United Youth for Peace and Development, Inc.)

Rahib Kudto was born in Pagalungan, Maguindanao. He was National President of the United Youth of the Philippines (UNYPHIL) from 1998 to 2004, Deputy Secretary-General of the Mindanao Peoples Caucus (MPC) from 2007 to 2010, and Chairman of the Kutawato Regional Management Committee of the Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society (CBCS) from 1998 to 2011. He has been President of the United Youth for Peace and Development, Inc. (UNYPAD) since 2004, and is currently Chairman of the Cotabato City Coalition for Change (4C's) and visiting lecturer in the Graduate School of the Cotabato Foundation College of Science and Technology (CFCST).

HuseyinOruçtpmt.oruc@gmail.com

(IHH)

Huseyin Oruç was born in Malatya, Turkey, 1969. He gained diplomas in Tourism Management and Public Management. He is one of the founders of The Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief (IHH), a Turkish NGO based in Istanbul, and has managed various international projects of IHH. He is a founding Trustee of The Humanitarian Forum (UK), and founding member of UNIW (the Union of NGOs of the Islamic World) on behalf of IHH. He was head of the Preparation Committee of Code of Conduct for Islamic NGOs for OIC, and is a delegate of IHH for UN and OIC. He is Deputy President Of IHH Board of Trustees, responsible for Humanitarian Diplomacy and Mediation project. He is married and has three children.

Karen N. Tañada

tpmt.tanada@gmail.com

(Gaston Z Ortigas Peace Institute)

Rebecca “Karen” N. Tanada, is Executive Director of Gaston Z. Ortigas Peace Institute, a service base and resource centre for peace and conflict resolutions in the Philippines, supporting citizen’s participation in peace processes. From 2001-4, she served as member of the Reciprocal Working Committee on Social and Economic Reforms of the government peace panel negotiating with the National Democratic Front. She is also Co-coordinator for Southeast Asia of Peace Women Across the Globe, and a member of the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) Working Group on Enabling Collaboration and GPPAC Gender Core Group.

Sam Chittick

tpmt.chittick@gmail.com

(The Asia Foundation)

Sam Chittick is an Australian based in the Philippines, and currently the Philippines Country Representative of the Asia Foundation. He has ten years’ experience in the Philippines, and more than twenty years’ experience on issues of government and decentralization; peace, security, and conflict; local economic development; and human rights and the rule of law. He has worked within NGOs, the World Bank, Australian Aid, the United Nations, and GIZ in 14 countries across Asia and Africa.

Annex IV

Calendar of TPMT sessions

For this period, the TPMT convened three times virtually (see schedule below). In addition, some TPMT members attended as observers in some peace process-related meetings and events.

- 16 February to 19 March 2021
- 24 May to 9 June 2021
- 12 September to 14 October 2021

Annex V**Members of the Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA)**

- 1) Ahod B. Ebrahim
- 2) Ali B. Solaiman
- 3) Mohagher M. Iqbal
- 4) Abdulraof A. Macacua
- 5) Ibrahim D. Ali
- 6) Haron M. Abas
- 7) Mohammad Zainoden P. Bato
- 8) Said Z. Salendab
- 9) Ust. Mohammad S. Yacob
- 10) Malik A. Mantawil
- 11) Alik O. Salik
- 12) Abdulwahab M. Pak
- 13) Said M. Shiek
- 14) Ubaida C. Pacasem
- 15) Hussein P. Muñoz
- 16) Ust. Abdullah E. Gayak
- 17) Arch. Eduard U. Guerra
- 18) Engr. Aida M. Silongan
- 19) Atty. Raissa H. Jajurie
- 20) Datu Tucao O. Mastura
- 21) Datu Midpantao M. Midtimbang
- 22) Al-Sayed A. Sali
- 23) Dr. Saffrullah M. Dipatuan
- 24) Abdullah A. Ahang
- 25) Bai Maleiha B. Candao
- 26) Narciso C. Yu Ekey
- 27) Hadja Bainon G. Karon
- 28) Basit S. Abbas
- 29) Suwaib L. Oranon
- 30) Akmad I. Abas
- 31) Abdullah G. Macapaar
- 32) Faiz S. Alauddin
- 33) Hadji Abuladzis M. Esmael
- 34) Marjanie S. Macasalong
- 35) Atty. Lanang T. Ali Jr.
- 36) Atty. Ali Pangalian M. Balindong
- 37) Zasar H. Ali
- 38) Melanio U. Ulama
- 39) Muslima A. Asmawil
- 40) Mudjib C. Abu
- 41) Abdullah B. Hashim
- 42) Muslimin A. Jakilan
- 43) Sahie S. Udjah
- 44) Adzfar H. Usman
- 45) Atty. Omar Yasser C. Sema
- 46) Romeo K. Sema
- 47) Punduma B. Sani
- 48) Albakil D. Jikiri (who replaced Abdul R. Sahrin who passed away on 20 January 2021)
- 49) Hatimil E. Hassan
- 50) Md ZulQarneyn M. Abas
- 51) Musa Kadola-Sultan Diamla
- 52) Rasul E. Ismael
- 53) Sittie Shahara I. Mastura
- 54) Amilbahar S. Mawallil
- 55) Eddie M. Alih
- 56) Khadafeh G. Mangudadatu
- 57) Jamel D. Macaraya
- 58) Modayao M. Sacar
- 59) Abraham T. Burahan
- 60) Sultan Edrieza Nasser H. Rimbang
- 61) Paisalin P. Tago
- 62) Nabila Margarita P. Pangandaman
- 63) Atty. Laisa M. Alamia
- 64) Suharto M. Ambolodto
- 65) Susana S. Anayatin, PhD
- 66) Atty. Maisara C. Dandamun-Latiph
- 67) Datu Mussolini S. Lidasan
- 68) Engr. Don Mustapha A. Loong
- 69) Atty. Jose I. Lorena
- 70) Ust. Abdulmuhmin A. Mujahid
- 71) Romeo C. Saliga
- 72) Prof. Alzad T. Sattar
- 73) Atty. Nabil A. Tan
- 74) Hamid A. Datu Barra, PhD
- 75) Atty. Anna Tarhata S. Basman
- 76) Engr. Baintan Adil Ampatuan
- 77) Ziaurrahman Alonto-Adiong
- 78) Rasol Mitmug, Jr.
- 79) Diamila D. Ramos
- 80) Ali B. Sangki